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Abstract  4 
We examine the impact of Australia’s Remuneration Amendment Act 2011 on CEO 5 
compensation and its spill-over effect on cash holdings to better understand how the new 6 
legislation affects the principal–agent relationship. Using a sample of ASX top 300 firms from 7 
2004 to 2015, we find that the Act leads to more use of equity-based compensation. We also 8 
document that, after the introduction of the Act, CEO equity-based and total compensations are 9 
negatively related with cash holdings, i.e., more equity and total compensations lead to lower 10 
cash holdings (a spill-over effect), indicating alignment of the principal–agent interests. We 11 
praise the Act for the achievements. Our results are robust to different estimation techniques. 12 
Our findings provide important insights for the discussion on compensation regulations. 13 
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1 Introduction 16 
Australia introduced a new shareholder ‘say on pay’ legislation, Corporations Amendment 17 
(Improving Accountability on Director and Executive Remuneration) Act 2011 (the 18 
Remuneration Amendment Act or the Act, hereafter), which took effect on 1 July 2011. The 19 
Remuneration Amendment Act sets out unique requirements that enable shareholders to register 20 
their dissenting votes more effectually against CEO remuneration plans at the Annual General 21 
Meetings (AGMs)1 and that force firms to face potentially severe consequences if shareholder 22 
concerns are not adequately addressed (Monem and Ng, 2013; Grosse et al., 2017). Due to its 23 
unique requirements, the Act has undoubtedly the capacity to influence firms’ CEO 24 
compensation policies directly and other related policies indirectly (Walker, 2010; Grosse et 25 
al., 2017). This study examines two related research questions arising from the Act: (1) what 26 
impact does the Act have on CEO compensation, in total and in composition? (2) how does 27 
CEO compensation relate, after the Act, to corporate cash holdings – a key firm policy? 28 
The Remuneration Amendment Act, widely known as the ‘two-strikes’ rule, provides 29 
shareholders, especially the dispersed and minority groups, with a more effective mechanism 30 
to register their dissent on CEO remuneration plans with a low cut-off point (i.e., a minimum 31 
25% of votes) to trigger a ‘strike’ against the firm. If a firm receives a strike at two consecutive 32 
AGMs, shareholders can vote at the second AGM to decide whether the board should be put 33 
up for re-election: if approved, a re-election of the board will take place. The Act also sets out 34 
clear process and actions for corporate boards to undertake to address shareholder concerns, 35 
and explains the consequences if shareholder concerns are not adequately mitigated. The 36 
requirements are specific and the consequences are predictable and potentially severe: 37 
dissolution and re-election of boards (Monem and Ng, 2013; Grosse et al., 2017). With the 38 
rigorous requirements of the Act, shareholders can expect to obtain their preferred ways to 39 
                                                          
1 Although the Act governs director and executive remuneration, our focus is on CEO remuneration, as the latter is the main concern of 
excessive pay. 
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remunerate executives more easily, and firms will amend and implement remuneration policies 40 
to satisfy shareholder demands. 41 
Since the two-strikes rule was enacted, a few studies have investigated the effect of the 42 
Act on CEO compensation from different perspectives. For instance, Monem and Ng (2013) 43 
and Bugeja et al. (2016) examine the impact of receiving a strike on the pay–performance link, 44 
and Faghani et al. (2015) and Grosse et al. (2017) investigate the association between CEO pay 45 
and the incidence of receiving a strike. These studies employ strike data and matched-pair 46 
design: they identify firms that receive strike (either ‘first strike’ only or ‘first strike’ and 47 
‘second strike’) and match each strike firm with a ‘non-strike’ firm to examine the impact of 48 
the Act.  49 
While these studies provide useful insight into shareholder dissent votes, they have not 50 
examined the intended influence of the Act on CEO pay (in total and in composition) in all the 51 
firms under the Act, given that the firms are obliged to implement the regulatory requirements. 52 
It is reasonable to expect that, after the Act became effective, all firms (both strike and non-53 
strike firms) would endeavor to review CEO compensation and adjust, if needed, to meet the 54 
Act’s requirements and the shareholders’ expectations, to avoid receiving dissent votes. The 55 
analysis of only strike firms, matched with non-strike firms, in these studies does not preclude 56 
the possibility that the Act has impacted the CEO compensation of the firms that are not 57 
examined.2 Consequently, the question regarding the impact the Act has on CEO compensation 58 
across the market remains unanswered (Shan and Walter, 2016). We are motivated to fill this 59 
research gap by investigating the impact of the Act on CEO compensation in terms of the total 60 
pay and three main pay components: stock options, equity-based (including stock options and 61 
shares) compensation and cash bonuses.3 We find that, after the Act, Australian firms use fewer 62 
                                                          
2 Monem and Ng (2013) observe that their sample includes mostly small and less profitable firms, indicating that the strike data may not be 
representative of the market. 
3 In Australia, CEO compensation usually reports these components: base salary, cash bonus (short term incentives), non-monetary benefits, 
superannuation benefits, termination benefits, equity-based payments and total remuneration (Grosse et al., 2017). In this study, we focus on 
cash bonus, options, equity-based compensation and total compensation.  
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cash bonuses and more equity-based compensation, resulting in an increase in total 63 
compensation. 64 
Corporations worldwide have considerably increased their cash holdings over the past 65 
two decades (Iskandar-Datta and Jia, 2012; Amess et al., 2015) and Australian firms show 66 
similar patterns (La Cava and Windsor, 2016). As excess cash holdings are considered 67 
detrimental to shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 68 
2007; Tong, 2010), the phenomenon has attracted enormous research interest in investigating 69 
the causes and consequences of cash holdings (Amess et al., 2015). The causes are linked to 70 
the management motive for holding cash, while the consequences are examined through 71 
different measures, such as the value of cash holdings and firm performance. The management 72 
motive for holding excess cash is in turn associated with CEO compensation incentives (Opler 73 
et al., 1999; Tong, 2010; Liu and Mauer, 2011).  74 
Excess cash holdings are said to be an agency problem due to managerial opportunism 75 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Prior studies have examined how CEO compensation incentives 76 
(as an internal governance mechanism) influence corporate cash holding decisions: an efficient 77 
CEO pay structure that aligns the interests of managers and shareholders can limit a firm’s 78 
investment in non-operational cash (e.g., Tong, 2010; Liu and Mauer, 2011). Equity-based 79 
compensation (e.g., options and shares) can help overcome managers’ aversion to risk, aligning 80 
their interests with those of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Murphy, 81 
1990; Clarkson et al., 2011). With increased equity components in total compensation, 82 
managers would be motivated to pursue profitable investment projects to maximize shareholder 83 
value rather than to hold cash. Prior studies, which investigate the relationship between CEO 84 
compensation incentives and cash holdings, document that equity-based incentives can limit 85 
firms’ investment in cash (e.g., Tong, 2010). 86 
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The Act’s capacity to influence CEO pay composition (resulting in fewer cash bonuses 87 
and more equity-based pay) leads to changes in CEO compensation incentives. Knowing that 88 
CEO’s equity-based compensation better aligns management incentives with shareholders’ 89 
interests, we expect firms to adopt cash policies that maximize firm value and shareholder 90 
wealth. Furthermore, shareholders may also take the opportunity of a dissenting vote to express 91 
their concerns over other firm policies such as dividend and leverage (Grosse et al., 2017). 92 
Consequently, we expect the Act (as an external governance mechanism) has a spill-over effect 93 
on corporate cash holdings. To date, however, no empirical study examines this important 94 
relationship. Our study fills this research gap by investigating the interaction effect of the Act 95 
and CEO compensation on cash holdings. 96 
Our sample consists of the top 300 capitalized firms listed on the Australian Stock 97 
Exchange (ASX) for the period 2004 to 2015, yielding 3,064 firm-year observations. We 98 
conduct an empirical analysis using several multivariate tests. We find the Act impacts CEO 99 
compensation structure, in that Australian firms now use more equity-based incentives (i.e., 100 
options and shares) and fewer cash bonuses to remunerate CEOs, which also results in higher 101 
total compensation. We also find, after the Act, that CEO’s equity-based and total pay 102 
incentives are negatively related to cash holdings, a key corporate policy, suggesting that higher 103 
CEO equity (thus risk) incentives lead to lower cash holdings. Further, we report a positive 104 
relationship between CEO incentives and the value of cash holdings after the Act. Overall, our 105 
results indicate that the Act has caused positive changes to CEO equity compensation and has 106 
a spill-over effect on cash holdings. Our results are robust to several econometrical techniques 107 
including the ordinary least square (OLS), and fixed effect (FE). Our results are consistent and 108 
robust to narrow samples, the two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM), and 109 
the propensity score matching (PSM) estimators. 110 
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We contribute to the CEO compensation literature in the following ways. First, our 111 
findings suggest that the Act is effective in changing the CEO compensation structure, leading 112 
to more equity-based incentives and fewer cash bonuses to remunerate CEOs. This change is 113 
observed across the market of large and established Australian firms, not just in firms that 114 
receive strikes (which are small and less profitable, according to Monem and Ng, 2013), and 115 
is consistent with shareholders’ preferences. Second, the Act leads to an increase in CEO total 116 
compensation, as a result of the increase in equity incentives more than the reduction in cash 117 
bonuses, due to the risk associated with equity compensation. This finding implies that 118 
shareholders do not use the two-strikes rule to target CEO total compensation (consistent with 119 
Grosse et al., 2017) as long as CEO pay structure meets their expectations. Third, we 120 
demonstrate in a novel piece of evidence that, after the Act, the relationship between CEO 121 
equity (as well as total) incentives and cash holdings is negative, indicating that the Act has a 122 
spill-over effect on cash holdings. This negative relationship indicates that the Act has the 123 
capacity to drive the alignment of the principal–agent interests through its influence on CEO 124 
compensation policies. In this regard, we praise the Act for its achievements. Our study, 125 
therefore, provides useful insight into this unique legislation and contributes to the global 126 
discussion on compensation regulations. 127 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related literature 128 
and develops the hypotheses; Section 3 describes the research design and models; Section 4 129 
presents the empirical results; and Section 5 concludes this paper. 130 
2 Related literature and hypothesis development 131 
2.1 Background of say on pay regulations 132 
In response to public outrage over CEO excessive pay, many countries have introduced 133 
say on pay regulations to enable shareholders to voice their dissent on CEO remuneration plans 134 
at AGMs. For instance, the UK enacted a mandatory non-binding shareholder vote on executive 135 
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pay through the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, and the US enacted the 136 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) in 2010. 137 
Australia enacted its first non-binding say on pay reforms through the Corporate Law 138 
Economic Reform (Audit Reform & Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (CLERP 9), which took 139 
effect on 1 July 2004.4 The non-binding nature means that firms are not required to act on 140 
shareholder concerns about the executive pay, even if the majority of the votes are dissenting 141 
(Monem and Ng, 2013). The evidence from the UK and Australia suggests that the non-binding 142 
votes are largely ignored by firms and are not effective in curbing excessive executive pay 143 
(Clarkson et al., 2011; Bugeja et al., 2016). To further empower shareholder say on pay, 144 
Australia introduced the Remuneration Amendment Act 2011 (the two-strikes rule), effective 145 
from 1 July 2011. 146 
Compared to the non-binding say on pay regulations, the two-strikes rule has a number of 147 
unique features that enable shareholders to register their dissent over CEO remuneration plans 148 
more easily and effectively. The Act requires only a minimum of 25% of ‘no’ votes to trigger 149 
a strike against the firm. If a firm receives a strike at two consecutive AGMs, shareholders can 150 
vote at the second AGM to decide whether the board (all directors except the CEO) should be 151 
put up for re-election within 90 days of the AGM (a ‘spill vote’). If 50% or more of the eligible 152 
votes cast support director re-election, then re-election (a ‘spill’ meeting) will occur following 153 
the normal 50% majority voting rule. The Act also sets out clear actions for boards to undertake 154 
to address shareholder concerns over pay resolutions or to face consequences if the concerns 155 
are not adequately addressed. The requirements are specific and the consequences are 156 
potentially severe: dissolution and re-election of boards (see, Monem and Ng, 2013 and Grosse 157 
et al., 2017 for further explanation of the Act). 158 
                                                          
4 See, Clarkson, Walker, and Nicholls (2011) for a summary that outlines the important regulatory events in relation to executive 
remuneration disclosure and practice in Australia from 1998 to 2005. 
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According to Monem and Ng (2013), the Act is the most significant corporate governance 159 
reform that Australian firms have observed since the implementation of the ASX corporate 160 
governance principles in 2003. Moreover, compared to other countries, the Act is regarded as 161 
“an internationally competitive system of executive remuneration that is transparent and 162 
accountable to shareholders” (a statement made by David Bradbury, Parliamentary Secretary 163 
to the Federal Treasurer, cited in Monem and Ng, 2013, p. 240). Given the rigorous 164 
requirements of the Act, Australia’s two-strikes rule provides a strong external governance 165 
mechanism on executive pay through which shareholders can expect to obtain their preferred 166 
ways to remunerate executives more easily, and firms will need to amend and implement 167 
remuneration policies to satisfy shareholder demands.  168 
2.2 Remuneration Amendment Act and CEO compensation 169 
Since the inception of the Act, a few studies that have examined its effect on CEO 170 
compensation from different perspectives have reported mixed results. Monem and Ng (2013), 171 
using strike data for 2011–2012 and matching strike firms with non-strike (control) firms, 172 
investigate the impact of receiving a strike on the pay–performance link. They find no relation 173 
between CEO pay changes and firm performance (using stock returns) for strike and control 174 
firms in 2011; however, there is a significant positive relation for both strike and control firms 175 
in 2012. In addition, they find the pay–performance link for the first-strike firms of 2011 (but 176 
avoided second-strike in 2012) strengthened in 2012 with lagged shareholder dissent. Their 177 
findings lend some support for the positive effect of the Act on the pay–performance link. In 178 
contrast, Bugeja et al. (2016), who analyze strike data for 2011–2014, find no improvement in 179 
the pay–performance link after the first strike, but find that the pay–performance link becomes 180 
worse after the second strike. They confirm, when examining responses to a strike, that firms 181 
are likely to make changes to the growth and mix of CEO pay. 182 
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Faghani et al. (2015), using strike data for 2011–2013, examine the relation between 183 
shareholder dissent votes and the level and composition of CEO remuneration. Their finding, 184 
that first strike firms avoiding a second strike reduce CEO total pay, which is associated with 185 
a lower level of shareholder dissenting votes on the following remuneration report. They also 186 
report that first strike firms increase the proportion of CEO’s performance-based pay. Grosse 187 
et al. (2017), using strike data for 2011 and 2012, report no association between CEO pay 188 
(including various components and total, normal and excess pay) and the incidence of receiving 189 
a strike. They conclude that shareholder dissenting votes are not used to target CEO excess 190 
pay. However, they find strike firms have a 57.10% greater decrease in the CEO’s cash bonus 191 
in the following year than non-strike firms have, suggesting that shareholder say on pay can 192 
change CEO compensation structures. 193 
To date, we are unaware of any study that examines the intended influence of the Act on 194 
CEO pay (in total and in composition) in all the firms that are obliged under the Act to 195 
implement the regulatory requirements. Murphy (2013) asserts that any compensation policy 196 
ignoring the government regulatory requirements is likely to ignore an important aspect of 197 
executive pay. The intended purposes of the Act are obviously to restrain CEO total pay and to 198 
achieve an efficient pay structure (that is, the use of various components of CEO pay, such as 199 
cash bonus and equity-based pay) that serves the best interests of shareholders. Therefore, it is 200 
reasonable to expect that, after the Act became effective, all firms (both strike and non-strike 201 
firms) would endeavor to review CEO compensation and adjust, if needed, to meet the Act’s 202 
requirements and the shareholders’ expectations, to avoid receiving dissent votes. 203 
We focus on the key CEO pay components (i.e., cash bonus, equity-based and total 204 
compensation) that have theoretical significance in the literature (Walker, 2010; Ferri and 205 
Maber, 2013; Grosse, et al., 2017). We expect firms would respond to the two-strikes rule by 206 
amending these components in accordance with shareholders’ expectations. Firms use cash 207 
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bonus to reward managers for achieving specific performance targets, usually written in 208 
accounting-based measures such as profitability. As such, cash bonuses have two main 209 
features: (1) they reward management for past performance and are not related to future 210 
performance of firms; (2) they are certain money paid to managers in the present and are not 211 
affected by firm risk in the future. Because of these features, cash bonuses have been criticized 212 
for inducing reckless short-term managerial decision-making (e.g., window dressing, earnings 213 
manipulation), thereby sacrificing firms’ long-term value (Walker, 2010), and have been 214 
labelled ‘rewards for failure’ (Ferri et al., 2008). Therefore, cash bonuses would not be the 215 
preferred way of pay for CEOs by shareholders.  216 
Equity-based compensation (options and shares), on the other hand, is long-term oriented 217 
and ties CEO pay to the firm’s future performance and value. To maximize the value of equity 218 
compensation, managers must maximize firm performance and value, consistent with the 219 
interests of shareholders. Therefore, we expect that shareholders, empowered by the Act, will 220 
want boards to remunerate CEOs with fewer cash bonuses and more equity compensation. The 221 
say on pay legislations in the UK, US, and EU countries observe the decline of cash bonuses 222 
in favor of equity-based compensation (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Dittmann et al., 2011; Ferri 223 
and Maber, 2013). Australian firms are also following the trend by enhancing the equity 224 
compensation in exchange for cash compensation (Matolcsy and Wright, 2007, 2011). 225 
Total compensation, an all-inclusive measure, is expected to increase under the Act. 226 
When firms pay managers with more equity compensation in exchange for fewer cash bonuses, 227 
managers do not equate the market value (price) of equity compensation to the nominal value 228 
of cash bonuses. This is because cash is certain money and risk free whereas equity 229 
compensation (options and shares) is tied to the firm’s future performance and value, which is 230 
risky. Meulbroek (2001) argues that managers are exposed to the firm’s total risk, but are 231 
rewarded (through expected returns) for only the systematic portion of that risk; hence 232 
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managers value stock or option-based compensation at less than its market value. Meulbroek 233 
(2001) finds that managers who, at the average NYSE firm have their entire wealth invested in 234 
the firm, value their options at 70% of their market value. Therefore, firms must compensate 235 
managers with a higher market value of equity compensation in exchange for a lower amount 236 
of cash bonuses, leading to an increase in total compensation.  This discussion leads to H1: 237 
H1: The Remuneration Amendment Act impacts CEO equity and total compensations 238 
positively, and cash bonus negatively. 239 
2.3 Remuneration Amendment Act, CEO compensation and corporate cash holdings 240 
Corporations worldwide have increased their cash holdings (in amount and in cash-to-241 
asset ratio) considerably over the past two decades (Amess et al., 2015; La Cava and Windsor, 242 
2016). Bates et al. (2009) document that the average cash-to-asset ratio for the US firms more 243 
than doubles over their sample period, from 10.5% in 1980 to 23.2% in 2006. Large cash 244 
holdings are also observed in the UK, Continental Europe, Japan, South Korea, and China 245 
(Iskandar-Datta and Jia, 2012; Amess et al., 2015; La Cava and Windsor, 2016). In Australia, 246 
La Cava and Windsor (2016) report that the average cash-to-asset ratio of listed companies 247 
between 1990 and 2014 is ranked among the top five in the OECD countries and exceeds that 248 
of their US counterparts.  249 
Excess cash holdings are considered detrimental to firm value and shareholder wealth 250 
for two main reasons. First, cash holdings are a negative net present value (NPV) project, from 251 
the investment perspective, because interest incomes from cash deposit earn a return less than 252 
the firm’s cost of capital (Tong, 2010) and are subject to double taxation (Opler et al., 1999). 253 
Second, cash holdings are easily accessible by managers, with little outside scrutiny, and are 254 
subject to managerial discretion in deployment (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Bates et al., 255 
2009). Self-interested managers keep excess cash for their private gains (e.g., perquisite 256 
consumptions) at the expense of shareholders.  257 
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Management motive for holding excess cash is said to be an agency problem (Jensen and 258 
Meckling, 1976; Amess et al., 2015). Since managers have undiversified interest in the firm, 259 
risk-eschewing managers would reduce firm risk to reduce their own risk (Jensen and 260 
Meckling, 1976; Tong, 2010; Liu and Mauer, 2011) and cash holdings are risk-free assets. 261 
Consequently, the agency theory asserts that managers keep high cash holdings to lower the 262 
firm (thus their own) risk, sacrificing firm (thus shareholder) value (Jensen and Meckling, 263 
1976; Tong, 2010). 264 
The agency motive for holding excess cash (due to managers’ lower risk preference or 265 
perquisite consumptions) is constrained by a system of good corporate governance (Jensen, 266 
1986; Amess et al., 2015), which includes internal mechanisms (e.g., board independence and 267 
CEO compensation incentives ) and external mechanisms (e.g., debt and regulations). A good 268 
internal governance mechanism can alleviate agency conflict through monitoring managers and 269 
designing CEO pay packages that lead to alignment of managers’ interests with those of 270 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Clarkson et al., 271 
2011). With the alignment of interests, the agency theory predicts that managers would act in 272 
the best interests of shareholders by reducing cash holdings and engaging in positive 273 
investment projects (Jensen, 1986; Coles et al., 2006; Amess et al., 2015). 274 
The relationship between CEO compensation incentives and cash holdings is an important 275 
issue from both theoretical and practical perspectives, as it helps to design a more efficient 276 
CEO pay structure that aligns the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Prior 277 
research, which investigates the question of how CEO compensation incentives influence 278 
corporate cash holdings (e.g., Tong, 2010; Liu and Mauer, 2011), documents that an efficient 279 
pay structure inducing interest alignment can limit firms’ investment in cash needed only to 280 
support operations (Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006). Prior research further 281 
argues that the equity component of compensation ties the managers’ wealth with that of the 282 
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firm (that is, risk-taking, or vega, incentives) and motivates managers to pursue riskier and 283 
more profitable investment projects to maximize shareholder value. Therefore, the relationship 284 
between CEO equity compensation and cash holdings is predicted to be negative (Jensen and 285 
Meckling, 1976; Coles et al., 2006; Tong, 2010; Amess et al., 2015).5  286 
The Act, a significant piece of legislation, provides a strong external governance 287 
mechanism to oversee corporates in Australia (Monem and Ng, 2013). It has the capacity to 288 
change CEO pay composition through empowering shareholder say on pay. More specifically, 289 
prior research finds that strike firms amend their remuneration policies by using fewer cash 290 
bonuses and more equity-based pay for CEOs (Faghani et al., 2015; Bugeja et al., 2016; Grosse 291 
et al., 2017). The change in the CEO compensation structure (in particular, the increase in 292 
equity-based pay, also resulting in the increase in total pay) alters CEO compensation 293 
incentives, which leads to changes in related firm policies. Furthermore, the exercise of the 294 
two-strikes rule by shareholders is unlikely to be limited to CEO remuneration plans. 295 
Shareholders may also take the opportunity provided by the Act to express their concerns over 296 
other firm policies such as dividend and leverage (Grosse et al., 2017), as well as cash holdings. 297 
Prior research also concurs that shareholders target those firm policies indirectly associated 298 
with remuneration when expressing their dissent (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Ertimur et al., 2010; 299 
Grosse et al., 2017). Given the anticipated impact of the Act on CEO compensation and the 300 
likelihood of shareholders targeting other policies, it is expected that the Act (as an external 301 
governance mechanism) has a spill-over effect on corporate cash holdings. This spill-over 302 
effect, in turn, transfers some of the risk on the part of shareholders (related to high cash 303 
holdings) to risk-averse managers, thus aligning the interests between shareholders and 304 
                                                          
5 Tong (2010) finds that firms with higher CEO risk incentives have lower cash holdings. Similarly, Coles et al. (2006), Core and Guay (1999), 
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), and Williams and Rao (2006) find that higher CEO risk incentives are associated with riskier investment and 
financing policy choices. 
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managers (Tosi et al., 2000). We investigate the spill-over effect of the Act on corporate cash 305 
holdings through CEO compensation incentives, forming the second hypothesis:6  306 
H2: CEO equity and total compensations are negatively related to corporate cash holdings 307 
after the Remuneration Amendment Act.  308 
3 Research design 309 
3.1 Sample 310 
Our sample, obtained from Connect4, consists of the top 300 capitalized firms listed in the 311 
ASX from 2004 to 2015. The year 2004, the first year that Connect4 reports executive 312 
compensation information, includes items such as base salary, cash bonuses, share and option 313 
grants, and total compensation. The database divides the compensation into two sets: 314 
executives and directors. We collect compensation data for the “CEO/MD” position. We 315 
collect financial data of the sample firms from Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium. 316 
We match the ASX codes reported in the Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium database with 317 
the compensation data before combining the data from the two sources. The initial sample 318 
consists of 3,600 firm-year observations. We exclude the firm-years with missing observations 319 
for accounting and compensation variables. We also drop financial and utility firms due to their 320 
industry-specific liquidity requirements following prior studies (e.g., Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; 321 
Liu and Mauer, 2011). Finally, to be unbiased, we only allow firms to be part of the final sample 322 
if they are present in both the pre- and post-Act periods. The final sample consists of 3,064 323 
firm-year observations. We classify firms on the basis of two-digit codes of the Global Industry 324 
Classification System (GICS). All the variables (dollar amounts) are inflation adjusted to 2015 325 
dollars using the consumer price index. 326 
                                                          
6 The relation between cash bonus and cash holdings is not modelled as we see little theoretical significance in it. 
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3.2 Variables description 327 
Table 1 provides the name, measurement, and data sources of the independent, 328 
dependent, and control variables. The independent variables are the Remuneration Amendment 329 
Act and CEO compensation incentives (as dependent variables in H1) including options, equity 330 
compensation, total compensation and cash bonus. We model the Act as a dummy variable, 331 
equaling 0 before and 1 after the Act. Cash holdings (Cash), the dependent variable (in H2), is 332 
measured as a ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets, where total assets are 333 
defined as the book value of total assets, following prior studies (Bates et al., 2009; Nikolov 334 
and Whited, 2014; Liu et al., 2015).  335 
CEO compensation incentives are measured using the four variables. First, options 336 
compensation (Ln options) is a natural log of the sum of the total value of options granted to 337 
CEOs in a year. Second, equity compensation (Ln equity comp) is a natural log of the sum of 338 
the total value of shares and stock options granted to CEOs each year. Equity compensation 339 
measures the overall risk arising out of executives’ holdings in firms. Third, following prior 340 
literature, total compensation (Ln total comp) is all-inclusive pay including salary, bonus, 341 
superannuation, LTIP and allowance, and equity incentives offered to CEOs in accordance with 342 
certain performance indicators during the year (see, Graham et al., 2012; Grosse et al., 2017). 343 
Fourth, cash bonus (Ln bonus) is the performance bonus granted to CEOs each year.  344 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 345 
Following prior studies (e.g., Bates et al., 2009), we control the firm characteristics for 346 
their effects: market-to-book ratio (MTB), capital expenditure (Capex), leverage ratio (Lev), 347 
dividend payout (Div), firm size (Size), cash flow (CF), CEO tenure (CEO tenure), 348 
remuneration committee size (Rem com size) and remuneration committee independence (Rem 349 
com ind) (see, Table 1 for definitions and measurements).  350 
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3.3 Descriptive statistics 351 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the variables for the full sample and for before 352 
and after the Act sub-samples. Panel A shows the statistics of the dependent variable cash 353 
holdings (cash) with mean, 1st quartile, median and 3rd quartile values, while Panels B and C 354 
show the statistics of the independent and control variables respectively.7 Panel A reports that 355 
cash holdings have a mean (median) of 18.333% (9.380%) to total assets, based on the full 356 
sample; however, after the Act, cash holdings decrease to 15.080% from 19.960%. Panel B 357 
reports the Act as a dummy variable. In log values, in the full sample, the means (medians) for 358 
options, equity compensation, total compensation and cash bonus are 12.575% (12.712%), 359 
12.714% (12.822%), 14.107% (14.044%) and 12.867% (12.916%), respectively. Moreover, 360 
mean values for options, equity, and total compensation (cash bonus) increase (decreases) after 361 
the Act.   362 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 363 
Panel C presents the control variables with mean values including average market to 364 
book value (MTB, 3.674), capital expenditure (Capex, -0.079), leverage (Lev, 0.173), dividend 365 
payment (Div, 0.714), firm size (Size, 20.327), and cash flow (CF, -0.012). Corporate 366 
governance characteristics include CEO tenure, which is 7.940 years on average. The 367 
remuneration committee, an important feature in the current unique setting, consists of 3 368 
members on average, with a 69.300% independence level compared with board size. 369 
                                                          
7 We perform the univariate test using the non-parametric t-test for cash holdings with respect to CEO compensation incentives before and 
after the Remuneration Amendment Act 2011. The two-tailed test of mean differences shows significant differences between compensation 
incentives before and after the Act at the 1% level. We run correlation among dependent and independent variables. We also perform the VIF 
test; it turns out to be 3.360, which is below 5, meaning that our results are not biased. However, we use compensation variables separately in 
our models to avoid spurious results. For brevity, we do not report the results in the paper, but they are available if required. 
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3.4 Econometric specification 370 
First, we model the effect of the Remuneration Amendment Act on CEO compensation 371 
incentives. As the Act is expected to affect CEO compensation structure, our model examines 372 
the Act, as an independent variable, on the key components of CEO pay: stock options (Ln 373 
options), equity (options and shares) compensation (Ln equity comp), total compensation (Ln 374 
total comp) and cash bonuses (Ln bonus). The model investigating H1 is shown in equation 375 
(1):   376 
	
 
	
 =  + (	) + (	) + ∑( !	" ##	) +377 
$∑(% ##	) + &            (1) 378 
Second, we model the spill-over effect of the Act on corporate cash holdings by 379 
interacting the Act and CEO compensation incentives. The model investigating H2 is: 380 
ℎ =  + (	
 
	
) + (	 ∗ 	
 
	
) +381 
(	) + $∑( !	" ##	) + )∑(% ##	) + &    (2) 382 
All the variables in equations 1 and 2 are defined in Table 1 and are measured for firm i. Control 383 
variables in both equations are measured at year t-1, α, β and δ represent model parameters, 384 
and & represents error term. 385 
We use ordinary least square (OLS) regression to analyze the relationship of the Act, the 386 
CEO compensation incentives and the cash holdings in time-series and cross–sectional 387 
differences, while controlling for industry (GICS) and year effects.8 To choose between the 388 
fixed effect and the random effect, we perform a Hausman test and the un-tabulated results 389 
confirm the suitability of fixed effect (FE) 9 to explore the time-series variation and to avoid 390 
misspecification of the model due to omitted variable bias. We use one-year lagged variables 391 
                                                          
8 For instance, CEOs in the financial services industry earn higher pay while CEOs in electric utility companies receive lower pay, compared 
to their counterparts in other industries (Murphy, 1999). Controlling for industry complexity, CEOs can demand higher compensation due to 
talent and industry (Aggarwal, 1981). 
9 The technique is commonly suggested for panel data estimation (see, Wooldridge, 2002 for details). 
18 
 
(controls) to avoid the simultaneity bias, following Harford et al. (2008). The standard errors 392 
are corrected for clustering of residuals at the firm level to control for heteroscedasticity 393 
(Petersen, 2009).  394 
3.5 Robustness check 395 
Our results may suffer from trending effect of the long sample period due to confounding 396 
factors and also CEO compensation incentives may be jointly determined by unknown factors 397 
after the Act (Grosse et al., 2017). In addition, our independent variables may not be 398 
systematically associated with the dependent variable (cash holdings) due to a causality issue. 399 
To mitigate potential endogeneity concerns in our findings, we use several sensitivity tests: for 400 
instance, stacking data in narrow samples, the two-step system generalized method of moments 401 
(GMM) (e.g., Harford et al., 2008), and the propensity score matching (PSM) estimators, as 402 
explained in Section 4. 403 
4 Empirical results 404 
4.1 Remuneration Amendment Act and CEO compensation 405 
Table 3 presents the results of equation (1), which analyzes the effect of the Act on CEO 406 
options, equity, total compensation and cash bonus using 12 years of data. The regression 407 
models are statistically well fitted, as depicted by the R-squares ranging from 0.286 to 0.484. 408 
For each dependent variable proxy, we run regressions using OLS and FE. Columns 1–6 report 409 
the effects of the Act on CEO options incentives (Ln options), equity incentives (Ln equity 410 
comp) and total compensation (Ln total comp), respectively, and all the coefficients are positive 411 
and significant (p < 1%). Columns 7–8 show the effect of the Act on the CEO cash bonus (Ln 412 
bonus): the results are insignificant, although both OLS and FE show a negative sign. We find 413 
that the control variables of market-to-book ratio, capital expenditure, leverage and firm size 414 
have varying levels of significance. The economic significance of the findings: the effect of 415 
the Act on CEO compensation incentives, is also important. For example, one standard 416 
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deviation in the Act (Table 2) increases (decreases) Ln options, Ln equity comp, Ln total comp 417 
(Ln bonus) by approximately 0.87%, 0.95%, 0.84% (-0.36%), respectively in the OLS (e.g., 418 
Act 0.471 × 0.234/ Ln options 12.575 = 0.0087). 419 
[Insert Table 3 here] 420 
To examine the impact of the Act on CEO compensation more closely and to minimize the 421 
trending effect of data, we re-run our equation (1) using a narrow sample with six years of data, 422 
three years (2008–2010) before and three years (2012–2014) after the Act (2011). We choose 423 
a narrow sample of six years, following Ferri and Maber (2013), who examine the impact of 424 
the UK say on pay legislation on CEO pay using three years of pre- and post-legislation data. 425 
Ferri and Maber (2013) also argue that a long-period sample may have a trending effect where 426 
many confounding factors that are not investigated may come into play.  427 
   Table 4 presents the results of the impact of the Act on CEO compensation using the 6-428 
year window. Overall, we find that the Act’s effects on CEO options, equity and total 429 
compensation are positive and significant at varying levels of significance, consistent with the 430 
Table 3 results. Importantly, the narrow sample shows that the Act impacts the performance-431 
based cash bonus (Ln bonus) negatively, significant at 10% level (using OLS). This outcome 432 
is interesting as it indicates the use of cash bonus by firms to remunerate CEOs is decreased 433 
after the Act.10 The economic significance estimations of the narrow sample findings show that 434 
one standard deviation in the Act (Table 2) increases (decreases) Ln options, Ln equity comp, 435 
Ln total comp (Ln bonus) by approximately 0.90%, 0.62%, 0.34% (-0.40%), respectively in the 436 
OLS (e.g., Act 0.471 × 0.241/ Ln options 12.575 = 0.0090). 437 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 438 
                                                          
10 We also use a 4-year window, two years before and two years after the Act and the results are statistically similar. 
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Results in Tables 3 and 4 show that the Act impacts equity (options and shares) and total 439 
compensation positively and cash bonus negatively, supporting H1. The findings suggest that, 440 
after the Act, firms have changed their CEO compensation structure by using more equity-441 
based compensation, which is preferred by shareholders and which enables alignment of 442 
interests between managers and shareholders, and fewer performance-based bonuses, which 443 
reward past performance. 444 
4.2 Robustness 445 
In this section, we conduct a set of sensitivity tests to check the robustness of our results. 446 
Our sensitivity tests employ a narrow sample analysis, the two-step system GMM, and 447 
propensity score matching estimators. We report the results of two-step system GMM and 448 
propensity score matching estimators (PSM) only, for the purpose of brevity. The result of the 449 
remaining test is available in the online appendix A. 450 
We re-estimate equation (1) using the two-step system GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995; 451 
Blundell and Bond, 1998) to test the robustness of the results. This system GMM uses first-452 
differenced variables as instruments for the equations in levels and the estimates are robust to 453 
undetected heterogeneity, causality problems and dynamic endogeneity (if present) in model.11 454 
The stability of the system GMM depends on two major conditions. First, the serial 455 
independence of the residuals is that the first difference residuals (AR1) should be serially 456 
correlated by the means of structure, and the second difference residuals (AR2) should not be 457 
serially correlated. Second, the validity of instruments should be used in the dynamic 458 
estimation. The Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions tests the null hypothesis of 459 
the instrument validity. In Table 5, the insignificance of the Hansen J-statistics confirms the 460 
validity of the instruments in their respective estimations. Moreover, the number of instruments 461 
                                                          
11 The system GMM estimations are based on Roodman (2006) using Stata module ‘xtabond2’. Refer to Roodman (2006) for details on 
dynamic panel data estimations. 
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(i.e., 28) used in the model is less than the panel (i.e., 917), which adds to the reliability of the 462 
Hansen J-statistics.  463 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 464 
The diagnostic test in Table 5 shows that the model is statistically well-fitted for the first 465 
order autocorrelation (AR1), but is insignificant for the second order autocorrelation (AR2), and 466 
for the Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions. The interpretations of the parameters 467 
on the Act and the CEO compensation incentives quantitatively remain the same as in Table 3. 468 
For instance, the Act positively affects Ln options, Ln equity comp, and Ln total comp. Hence, 469 
the system GMM estimate supports our results, even after controlling for undetected 470 
heterogeneity, simultaneity bias and dynamic endogeneity. 471 
Moreover, we use PSM (Lennox et al., 2011) to examine whether our prior analyses 472 
concerning the effect of compensation incentives after the Act (an exogenous shock) on cash 473 
holdings are robust. PSM exploits the assumption of ‘parallel trends’, that is, two similar firms 474 
are expected to follow the same trend without any treatment. In case the treatment occurs, the 475 
impact should be reflected in the difference between the changes of outcome treatment and 476 
control firms (Roberts and Whited, 2011). We compare the changes in cash holdings for the 477 
two groups of firms, which are similar in characteristics but which experienced different 478 
changes in compensation incentives around the time of the Act. Following prior studies (e.g., 479 
Brogaard et al., 2017), we focus on a narrow sample because it reduces the concerns of reverse 480 
causality and offers better control over the impact of unobserved factors. We use three years 481 
before and three years after the Act to form our treatment and control groups. 482 
We follow Fang et al. (2014) and Brogaard et al. (2017) to construct our treatment and 483 
control groups. The sample firms are ranked on the basis of changes in their compensation 484 
incentives (Ln options, Ln equity comp, and Ln total comp) around the Act (3 years before and 485 
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after), and we retain and assign firms into the first and third terciles. We create three dummy 486 
variables (options_dummy, equity_dummy, and total_dummy), equaling 1 for firms in the top 487 
tercile (the treatment group) and 0 for the firms in the bottom tercile (the control group). The 488 
treatment (control) group consists of firms with the highest (lowest) increase in compensation 489 
incentives. The rationale is that the Act encourages firms to use equity incentives that lead to 490 
shareholders’ wealth maximization.  491 
First, we run the logistic regression for these dummy variables with other explanatory 492 
variables. The firms in the treatment group are matched to the firms in the control group with 493 
the closest propensity score matching within 0.01.12 In case of multiple matching, we retain the 494 
pairs for which the propensity score is the smallest. This criterion yields a treatment and a 495 
control group with similar firm characteristics and compensation incentives prior to the Act but 496 
with different degrees of change in compensation incentives (Ln options, Ln equity comp and 497 
Ln total comp) after the Act. The results of the pre-match logistic regression are reported in 498 
Panel A of Table 6 (Columns 1–3). The pseudo R-square is high for the regressions (0.148, 499 
0.141, and 0.251, respectively).  500 
To further verify that the firms in the treatment and control groups are indistinguishable 501 
in terms of observable characteristics, we conduct two diagnostic tests following Chen et al. 502 
(2017). The first test re-estimates the logit model for the post-match sample. The results in 503 
Panel A of Table 6 (Columns 4–6) suggest that all the variables are insignificant, indicating 504 
that there are no distinguishable trends in the treatment and control groups. The magnitude of 505 
coefficients in the post-match regression are smaller and insignificant, suggesting a decline in 506 
the degree of freedom in the restricted sample. Moreover, the pseudo R-squares decline for 507 
post-match regressions. This suggests that propensity score matching removes all observable 508 
                                                          
12
 Our results (un-tabulated) hold if we increase the permissible difference in propensity scores (1.0% and 0.5% in value). 
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differences in the two groups. The second diagnostic test examines the differences in the mean 509 
of each observable characteristic between the treatment and the control firms. Panel B of Table 510 
6 shows that between the treatment and control groups there are no statistically significant 511 
differences in the pre-Act period. 13  Moreover, the two groups have identical levels of 512 
compensation prior to the Act, even if the Act affects them differently. Overall, the diagnostic 513 
tests suggest that propensity score matching removes all of the observable differences known 514 
to affect the dependent variable (cash holdings). 515 
 [Insert Table 6 about here] 516 
Panel C of Table 6 shows a significant difference (post-Act) in the treatment and control 517 
firms’ compensation incentives, suggesting the effect of the Act. 14  Panel D shows the 518 
regression results based on the matched sample. We report coefficients of variables of interest 519 
(for the sake of brevity) that show the treatment firms experience a positive change in 520 
compensation incentives after the Act.15 These findings are consistent with our main results. 521 
4.3 Remuneration Amendment Act, CEO compensation and cash holdings 522 
Table 7 presents the results based on equation (2), which examines the spill-over effect 523 
of the Act on cash holdings using interaction between the Act and CEO compensation 524 
incentives.16 Columns 1–6 show the interaction effect of Ln options × Act, Ln equity comp × 525 
Act and Ln total comp × Act on cash holdings. Interestingly, the three pairs of relationships – 526 
CEO options and cash holdings, equity compensation and cash holdings, total compensation 527 
and cash holdings – are negative after the introduction of the Act.17 Columns 1 and 2 show the 528 
interaction effect of Ln options × Act: the coefficients are negative for OLS (-0.011) and FE (-529 
                                                          
13 Mean difference between the treatment and the control group is based on the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). 
14
 We report differences for main independent variables for the purpose of brevity. 
15
 We also perform propensity score matching analysis that shows a significant difference in cash holdings between the treatment and control 
firms after the Act. These findings suggest that the decrease in cash holdings is attributable to compensation incentives after the Act. 
16 We also test the relationship between CEO compensation incentives and cash holdings in Australian firms. Detailed results are available in 
the online appendix A. 
17 As shown in the online appendix A, the relationships between CEO compensation incentives and cash holdings are positive without the Act 
in the model. The results, without the Act mean that higher compensation incentives lead to higher cash holdings, indicating an agency problem. 
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0.013), both at p < 1%. Columns 3 and 4 show the interaction effect of Ln equity comp × Act: 530 
the coefficients are negative for OLS (-0.012) and FE (-0.011), significant at p < 1% and p < 531 
5%, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 show the interaction effect of Ln total comp × Act: the 532 
coefficients are negative for OLS (-0.001) and FE (-0.001), significant at p < 1% and p < 5%, 533 
respectively.18 534 
    [Insert Table 7 about here] 535 
The economic significance estimations also show an important aspect: one standard 536 
deviation increase in CEO options award and equity compensation after the implementation of 537 
the Act would result in decreasing the cash level by 9.30% (Ln1.549×-0.011/Ln0.183 = -0.093) 538 
and 10.50% (Ln1.579×-0.0122/Ln0.183 = -0.105), respectively. Total compensation, an 539 
important aspect which also significantly decreases cash holdings, in addition to equity-based 540 
incentives, is often overlooked in the literature (e.g., Tong, 2010; Liu and Mauer, 2011). 541 
The negative effect of the interaction of the Act and CEO compensation incentives on 542 
cash holdings indicates that, after the Act, higher CEO compensation incentives lead to lower 543 
corporate cash holdings. These negative relations are mainly driven by equity-based incentives 544 
(i.e., options and shares) as hypothesized, whereas the total compensation follows the direction 545 
of equity compensation. The findings suggest that CEOs who are rewarded with more equity-546 
based incentives are more inclined to invest in positive net present value projects rather than to 547 
hold cash. This move of executives enhances firm value and is consistent with shareholders’ 548 
interests. This result that the Act through its influence on CEO compensation incentives leads 549 
to lower cash holdings, supports H2. Three reasons explain the CEOs’ adoption of the 550 
alignment motive: (1) Equity-based incentives tie CEO’s wealth with that of shareholders and 551 
the Act also prohibits managers from hedging their equity; (2) CEOs are likely to avoid 552 
                                                          
18 To check for any trending effect, we re-run our models using a 6-year narrow window, 3 years before and 3 years after the Act, to examine 
the interaction of the Act and CEO compensation incentives. The results are statistically similar to those reported in the Table 7. 
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shareholder dissent votes on remuneration resolutions; (3) CEOs are likely to avoid shareholder 553 
dissent votes targeting firm cash holding policy (see, Grosse et al., 2017). 554 
Further, we examine the effect of CEO compensation incentives after the Act on the value 555 
of cash holdings in line with the argument that CEO incentives help reduce the agency cost and 556 
align the interests of managers and shareholders by lowering cash holdings. We follow the 557 
Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) approach to investigate the value of cash holdings (further 558 
detail on methodology is available in the online appendix A). This approach is widely used in 559 
literature to examine the value of cash holdings (e.g., Tong, 2010). We report results in Table 560 
8. We find that the coefficients of interaction between CEO compensation incentives, the Act, 561 
and change in cash holdings (across the three Columns 1–3) are positively associated with the 562 
dependent variable (excess return). These findings are consistent and further support our H2 563 
that after the Act CEO compensation incentives are positively associated with the value of cash 564 
holdings. 565 
[Insert Table 8 about here]  566 
5 Conclusion 567 
This study contributes to the compensation literature by investigating the effect of the 568 
Remuneration Amendment Act on CEO compensation incentives and a spill-over effect on cash 569 
holdings in Australian firms. We find that the Act has affected the CEO compensation practices 570 
of Australian firms, indicating that firms now use more equity-based incentives (i.e. options 571 
and shares) and fewer cash bonuses to remunerate CEOs; this also results in increases in total 572 
compensation due to inequality in values between cash and equity remunerations. This change 573 
in the compensation structure and the increased use of equity incentives after the Act links 574 
CEO’s pay more closely to the firm’s future operations, and is in line with international (e.g., 575 
US and UK) trends and with the recommendations of the ASX Corporate Governance Council 576 
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(ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 2014) that encourage the use 577 
of equity incentives. Our results are robust to different estimation techniques.  578 
Moreover, after the introduction of the Act, CEO compensation incentives are negatively 579 
related to cash holdings, indicating that higher CEO equity (thus risk) incentives lead to lower 580 
cash holdings. Rewarded with more equity-based incentives after the Act, CEOs are inclined 581 
to take risks by investing cash holdings in profitable investment projects to maximize firm 582 
value, which aligns the interests of managers with those of shareholders. CEO compensation 583 
incentives after the Act are positively associated with the value of cash holdings. We conclude 584 
that the Act has the effects of making positive changes to CEO compensation structure and 585 
having a spill-over effect on cash holdings. For these achievements, we praise the Act. Our 586 
findings provide important insights for the discussion on compensation regulations. 587 
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Table 1 Variable definition 
  
Variables Name Measurement Data Source 
Cash Cash holdings Ratio of cash and marketable securities to book value of total 
assets 
DatAnalysis 
Act Remuneration Amendment Act Dummy variable post Act equals 1 and 0 otherwise  
Ln options Executive equity incentives-Proxy 1 Natural log of sum of total value of options granted to CEO in 
each year 
Connect 4 
Ln equity comp Executive equity incentives-Proxy 2 Natural log of sum of total value of options and shares granted to 
CEO in each year 
Connect 4 
Ln total comp Executive incentives-Proxy 3 Natural log of total value of salary, bonus, super, options, shares, 
LTIP and allowance granted to CEO in each year 
Connect 4 
Ln bonus Executive cash incentives-Proxy 4 Natural log of performance bonus granted to CEO in each year Connect 4 
Control Variables       
    
MTB Market to book asset ratio Calculated as market value equity plus book value of assets 
minus book value of equity divided by book value of assets 
DatAnalysis 
Capex Capital expenditure Capex is figured as capital expenditure divided by book value of 
assets 
DatAnalysis 
Lev Leverage Sum of long and short term debt divided by book value of assets DatAnalysis 
Div Dividend Dummy variable equal to one if dividend paid otherwise zero DatAnalysis 
Size Firm size Size is measured by log of total assets DatAnalysis 
CF Cash flow Free cash flow divided as book value of assets DatAnalysis 
CEO tenure CEO tenure Numbers of years being in position Connect 4 
Rem com size Remuneration committee size Percentage of member directors to board size Connect 4 
Rem com ind Remuneration committee 
Independence 
Dummy variable 0 ≤ 50% Independent directors otherwise 1 
≥50% 
Connect 4 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics       
Full sample Before Act After Act 
Variables              Mean 
  1st 
Quartile 
       Median 3rd Quartile      Std. Dev.           Mean           Mean 
Panel A: Dependent variable       
Cash 0.1833 0.0385 0.0938 0.2514 0.2132 0.1996 0.1508 
Panel B: independent variables       
Act 0.3333 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4715 0.0000 1.0000 
Ln options 12.5756 11.5923 12.7129 13.7134 1.5494 12.4093 12.8439 
Ln equity comp 12.7142 11.7194 12.8225 13.8854 1.5793 12.5764 13.9398 
Ln total comp 14.1078 13.4024 14.0446 14.8786 1.0993 13.9879 14.3474 
Ln bonus 12.8675 12.0173 12.9167 13.8316 1.2505 13.8675 11.8675 
Panel C: control variables        
MTB 3.6747 1.3005 2.2295 4.1288 5.8743 4.0796 2.8648 
Capex -0.0791 -0.1016 -0.0405 -0.0117 0.1072 -0.0847 -0.0679 
Lev 0.1730 0.0028 0.1503 0.283 0.1676 0.1667 0.1856 
Div 0.7147 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4516 0.6754 0.7933 
Size 20.3277 18.8944 20.1511 21.6979 2.1409 20.0768 20.8295 
CF -0.0120 -0.0666 0.0257 0.0757 0.2037 -0.0229 0.0098 
CEO tenure 7.9403 4.0000 6.0000 11.0000 5.9191 8.6771 6.4758 
Rem com size 3.0161 2.0000 3.0000 4.0000 1.6399 2.9035 3.2408 
Rem com ind 0.6930 0.5000 0.7500 1.0000 0.3205 0.6629 0.7488 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics in different panels with mean, first quartile (1st quartile), median, third quartile (3rd quartile) and standard 
deviation (Std. Dev.). Panel A presents cash holdings and Panel B describes the Act and CEO compensation incentives based on full, before and 
after the Act samples. Panel C presents the firm characteristics and corporate governance variables. All the variables in dollar amounts are adjusted 
to inflation to 2015 dollars using the consumer price index. The sample period is 2004–2015. For variable definitions see Table 1. 
 
 
33 
 
 
Table 3 The effect of the Act on CEO compensation incentives   
 
Variables Ln options Ln equity comp Ln total comp Ln bonus 
(1)  
OLS 
(2)  
FE 
(3)  
OLS 
(4)  
FE 
(5)  
OLS 
(6)  
FE 
(7)  
OLS 
(8)  
FE 
Act 0.2340*** 0.1309*** 0.2591*** 0.1095*** 0.2528*** 0.1967*** -0.1019 -0.0145 
 (3.21) (3.16) (3.17) (2.50) (3.77) (2.93) (-1.69) (-1.19) 
MTB t-1 -0.0534*** -0.0044* -0.0230** -0.0018*** -0.0004*** -0.0061*** 0.0027* 0.0012 
 (-4.95) (-1.89) (-2.15) (-2.60) (-2.24) (-3.05) (1.90) (1.06) 
Capex t-1 -3.7109*** -1.3911* -3.1611** -1.2712** -1.5020 -1.2552 -1.6189 -1.0302 
 (-2.76) (-1.81) (-2.16) (-2.40) (-1.07) (-1.05) (-0.53) (-0.87) 
Lev t-1 -0.1736 -0.1140 -0.1111 -0.804* -0.0447 -0.0146 0.3548*** 0.2783*** 
 (-0.87) (-0.65) (-0.63) (-1.84) (-1.15) (-1.24) (2.86) (2.68) 
Div t-1 -0.3582*** -0.4517** -0.5174*** -0.2065** 0.0473 0.0396 0.2568*** 0.1621*** 
 (-3.53) (-4.23) (-2.52) (-2.19) (1.22) (1.04) (2.71) (2.64) 
Size t-1 0.4111*** 0.3434*** 0.4023*** 0.3074*** 0.3962*** 0.3117*** 0.4173*** 0.3790*** 
 (9.17) (6.79) (9.54) (4.23) (3.65) (4.52) (3.18) (3.08) 
CF t-1 -1.2911* -1.3512 1.013 2.5912* -1.2750 -1.2501 -1.6132* -1.7125 
 (-1.89) (-0.47) (0.79) (1.79) (-0.77) (-0.60) (-1.89) (-0.48) 
CEO tenure t-1 0.0034 0.0153* 0.0013 0.0107* -0.0023 0.0057* 0.0146*** 0.0265** 
 (0.47) (1.99) (0.23) (1.82) (-1.04) (1.98) (3.90) (2.71) 
Rem com size t-1 0.0133 0.0091 0.0265 0.0175 0.0204 0.0093 0.0310 0.0205 
 (0.44) (0.52) (1.03) (0.83) (1.73) (1.06) (1.71) (1.39) 
Rem com ind t-1 0.2644*** 0.2575** 0.1611* 0.1535** 0.0412* 0.0262 0.1397** 0.1000* 
 (2.49) (2.81) (1.85) (1.99) (1.89) (0.84) (2.09) (1.86) 
Industry effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.2703*** 5.5107*** 3.91488*** 6.2999*** 5.4601*** 7.6540*** 3.4147*** 4.4494*** 
 (5.91) (3.78) (6.18) (9.82) (4.81) (3.87) (6.78) (2.90) 
N 1541 1541 1999 1999 3064 3064 2105 2105 
adjusted R2 0.324 0.314 0.331 0.286 0.361 0.309 0.484 0.476 
Table 3 shows the regression of the Act on CEO compensation incentives with other control variables (at year t-1) based on equation 1. The dependent 
variables are CEO compensation incentives in a given year. Columns 1–8 show the impact of the Act on Ln options, Ln equity comp, Ln total comp and Ln 
bonus in year t, respectively. Industry effects are based on Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS) codes. The t–statistics are heteroskedastic 
consistent standard errors clustered at firm level and reported below the parameters in parentheses. Standardized beta coefficients are reported at 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance levels with ***, **, * respectively. 
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Table 4 The effect of the Act on CEO compensation incentives: narrow sample 
Variables Ln options     Ln equity comp Ln total comp       Ln bonus 
(1)  
OLS 
(2)  
FE 
(3)  
OLS 
(4)  
FE 
(5)  
OLS 
(6)  
FE 
(7)  
OLS 
(8)  
FE 
Act 0.2414*** 0.2703** 0.1697** 0.2413** 0.1045*** 0.1102*** -0.1119* -0.0870 
 (2.65) (2.09) (2.44) (2.06) (3.02) (2.74) (-1.93) (-1.75) 
MTB t-1 -0.0703*** -0.0051* -0.0879** 0.0220 -0.0124** -0.0131* 0.0201* 0.0149 
 (-2.75) (-1.96) (-2.02) (1.71) (-2.17) (-1.94) (1.96) (1.15) 
Capex t-1 -0.7901* -2.0471** -0.3948* -1.4319* -0.1281* -0.1933 -0.2301 -0.6232 
 (-1.94) (-2.17) (-1.93) (-1.90) (-1.93) (-1.70) (-1.77) (-1.65) 
Lev t-1 -0.4753* -0.2101 0.2213 -0.7763* 0.0640 -0.2107 -0.0342 -0.1135* 
 (-1.89) (-1.55) (1.27) (-1.92) (1.45) (-1.69) (-1.19) (-1.92) 
Div t-1 -0.1230* -0.1947 -0.0475 -0.2324* -0.1349* 0.0158 0.2012*** -0.0372 
 (-1.93) (-1.70) (-1.35) (-1.97) (-1.92) (1.61) (2.14) (-1.41) 
Size t-1 0.3833*** 0.2304** 0.3112*** 0.2344** 0.3019** 0.3401*** 0.2204*** 0.3923*** 
 (5.16) (2.23) (2.91) (2.24) (2.26) (2.47) (3.04) (2.63) 
CF t-1 0.1920 0.2230 0.1027 0.3901 0.0234 0.1219 0.2405* 0.0219 
 (1.03) (1.57) (1.53) (1.76) (1.63) (1.01) (1.89) (1.09) 
CEO tenure t-1 0.0116 0.0032 0.1235 0.076 0.0204 0.0111 0.0273*** 0.0324** 
 (1.22) (0.97) (1.49) (1.06) (1.41) (1.20) (2.74) (2.11) 
Rem com size t-1 0.0382 0.0159* 0.3037 0.0372 0.0104** 0.0230 -0.3244 -0.0123 
 (1.76) (1.92) (1.74) (1.57) (2.11) (1.74) (-1.68) (-1.60) 
Rem com ind t-1 0.0331* 0.0112* 0.0329 0.1201* 0.1143** 0.0301* 0.1234 -0.1625* 
 (1.98) (1.89) (1.18) (1.90) (2.24) (1.95) (1.69) (-1.88) 
Industry effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.1042*** 5.0657*** 2.4498*** 3.0392** 3.0672*** 5.5023*** 3.2123*** 3.2125** 
 (3.19) (2.98) (3.87) (2.19) (4.83) (4.33) (3.18) (2.77) 
N 849 849 1112 1112 1597 1597 1110 1110 
adjusted R2 0.362 0.351 0.337 0.341 0.453 0.371 0.446 0.353 
Table 4 shows the regression of the Act on CEO compensation incentives along with other control variables (year t-1) based on a narrow window of 6 
years (3 years before and after the Act). The dependent variables are the CEO compensation incentives in a given year. Columns 1–8 show the impact of 
the Act on Ln options, Ln equity comp, Ln total comp and Ln bonus in year t, respectively. Industry effects are based on Global Industry Classification 
Standards (GICS) codes. The t–statistics are heteroskedastic consistent standard errors clustered at firm level and reported below the parameters in 
parentheses. Standardized beta coefficients are reported at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels with ***, **, * respectively. 
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Table 5 Two-step system GMM regression   
Variables Ln options Ln equity comp Ln total comp 
Act 0.0896** 0.0264** 0.0290*** 
 (2.07) (2.24) (2.66) 
MTB 0.0412 -0.0072 0.0075 
 (1.00) (-0.24) (0.53) 
Capex -2.3424** -1.1931 -1.0965*** 
 (-2.23) (-1.41) (-2.59) 
Lev -0.0774 0.5878 0.1333 
 (-0.07) (0.59) (0.40) 
Div -1.0977 -1.1522 -0.1355 
 (-1.01) (-1.08) (-0.37) 
Size 1.0533*** 0.9424*** 0.5315*** 
 (5.29) (3.70) (6.03) 
CF -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (-0.54) (0.57) (0.70) 
CEO tenure 0.0062 0.0018 0.0155 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.61) 
Rem com size 0.2731 0.6543** 0.1699** 
 (0.67) (2.44) (2.00) 
Rem com ind 0.0172 -0.6838 0.0546 
 (0.02) (-0.91) (0.15) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -9.7127** -8.1887* 2.4590 
 (-2.54) (-1.76) (1.54) 
Model fits    
Wald χ2-statistics 57.070*** 36.150*** 108.230*** 
Arellando-Bond AR (1) -2.420*** -3.860*** -5.100*** 
 [0.015] [0.000] [0.000] 
Arellando-Bond AR (2) -0.910 -1.360 -0.960 
 [0.363] [0.174] [0.335] 
Hansen J-statistics 17.220 14.090 13.6700 
 [0.440] [0.660] [0.690] 
No. of instruments 28 28 28 
Table 5 shows the results of the two-step system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The dependent variables are CEO 
compensation incentives. The model fits include the system GMM reliability conditions: first order autocorrelation AR (1), second 
order autocorrelation AR (2), and Hansen J-statistics test for over-identifying restrictions. We used collapsed instruments to reduce 
the propagation and preserve the depth of sample. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics while brackets show the p-values. Coefficients 
are reported at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels with ***, **, * respectively. 
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Table 6 Propensity score matching estimators     
Panel A Pre-match Post-match 
Variables (1) 
options_dummy 
(2) 
equity_dummy 
(3) 
total_dummy 
(4) 
options_dummy 
(5) 
equity_dummy 
(6) 
total_dummy 
MTB -0.0049 0.1004 -0.0375 0.0000 0.0000 0.0057 
 (-0.54) (1.10) (-1.21) (0.01) (0.02) (0.76) 
Capex -4.9922*** -3.7746*** 1.5382* 0.9893 0.4924 0.1946 
 (-2.76) (-2.96) (1.92) (0.50) (0.31) (0.19) 
Lev -1.2481 0.1791 -0.4119 -0.1099 0.4230 0.2176 
 (-1.46) (0.27) (-0.95) (-0.12) (0.57) (0.40) 
Div 1.1146*** 1.1769*** -0.0775 0.2276 -0.3594 0.0202 
 (2.63) (3.42) (-0.42) (0.50) (-0.91) (0.09) 
Size 0.0265 0.2425 0.1624*** 0.0185 -0.0010 -0.0662 
 (0.20) (1.13) (2.65) (0.15) (-0.01) (-0.85) 
CF -0.0908 -0.0495 0.0366 -0.0345 -0.2087 0.0588 
 (-0.67) (-0.46) (0.63) (-0.24) (-0.83) (0.81) 
CEO tenure 0.0120 0.0150 -0.0060 -0.0057 0.0278 0.0136 
 (0.39) (0.61) (-0.47) (-0.17) (1.02) (0.83) 
Rem com size 0.0547 -0.0504 -0.0247 0.0157 0.0906 0.0271 
 (0.41) (-0.48) (-0.42) (0.10) (0.78) (0.38) 
Rem com ind 0.4503 0.1408 -0.1786 -0.2180 0.0107 0.0413 
 (0.97) (0.37) (-0.81) (-0.43) (0.03) (0.16) 
Constant -0.3121 -0.3867 -4.7735*** 0.1373 -1.7897 0.2385 
 (-0.20) (-0.30) (-6.35) (0.08) (-1.33) (0.25) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 756 990 1,510 264 384 674 
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.141 0.251 0.015 0.028 0.011 
 
 
Panel C: Differences in CEO compensation incentives post-Act  
Variable Treatment Control Difference t-stat 
Ln options 14.3719 12.0180 2.3539*** 4.6200 
Ln equity comp 14.1838 12.0575 2.1263*** 5.7100 
Ln total comp 15.3271 13.4245 1.9026*** 3.0700 
Panel D: Regression     
Variable options_dummy equity_dummy total_dummy  
Act 0.0071*** 0.0161** 0.0121***  
 (2.72) (2.19) (3.12)  
Other controls Yes Yes Yes  
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  
Firm year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  
Table 6 shows the results of propensity score matching estimators. Panel A shows the pre-
match and post-match regression results. Panel B shows the differences in firm 
characteristics in the pre-Act period. Panel C shows the differences in CEO incentives only 
(for the purpose of brevity) in the post-Act period. Panel D shows the regression results 
based on the matched sample. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Coefficients are 
reported at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels with ***, **, * respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Differences in firm characteristics pre-Act         
  options_dummy equity_dummy total_dummy 
Variable Treatment Control Difference t-stat Treatment Control Difference t-stat Treatment Control Difference t-stat 
Ln options 13.8849 13.8541 0.0307 0.1600         
Ln equity 
comp     13.8708 13.9423 -0.0715 -0.4100     
Ln total comp         14.4245 14.4768 -0.0522 -0.6000 
MTB 3.6294 3.2219 0.4075 0.6903 3.5145 3.1217 0.3928 0.2812 2.9494 2.2386 0.7107 0.8300 
Capex -0.0846 -0.0783 -0.0062 -0.4200 -0.0852 -0.0835 -0.0016 -0.1200 -0.0629 -0.0614 -0.0015 -0.2100 
Lev 0.1995 0.2391 -0.0396 -1.3500 0.2165 0.1980 0.0184 0.7800 0.1915 0.1905 0.0010 0.0700 
Div 0.8505 0.8661 -0.1550 -0.2400 0.8696 0.8695 0.0001 0.0000 0.7967 0.8387 -0.0419 -1.2100 
Size 21.5802 21.5375 0.0426 0.1200 21.6824 21.4085 0.2739 0.9000 21.3857 21.4275 -0.0417 -0.2400 
CF 18.9631 18.7202 0.2428 0.8400 18.9716 18.7365 0.2351 0.8500 18.5007 18.4809 0.0198 0.1200 
CEO tenure 6.6525 7.7322 -1.0797 -1.4200 6.7221 6.2010 0.5210 0.9600 6.1370 6.4010 -0.2640 -1.1200 
Rem com size 3.7480 3.4960 0.2519 1.4400 3.6847 3.6956 -0.0108 -0.0600 3.6870 3.6967 -0.0096 -0.0900 
Rem com ind 0.7572 0.7912 -0.0339 -0.7000 0.7681 0.7559 0.0121 0.2700 0.7230 0.7343 -0.0112 -0.4100 
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Table 7 The effect of the Act and CEO compensation incentives on cash holdings 
  
Variables 
                 Cash    
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
FE 
Ln options 0.0106*** 0.0121***     
 (2.69) (2.49)     
Ln options × Act -0.0119*** -0.0132***     
 (-2.99) (-2.84)     
Ln equity comp   0.0126*** 0.0141**   
   (3.40) (2.04)   
Ln equity comp × Act   -0.0122*** -0.0113**   
   (-2.41) (-2.19)   
Ln total comp     0.0165* 0.0145 
     (1.89) (1.76) 
Ln total comp × Act     -0.0012*** -0.0019** 
     (-2.74) (-2.13) 
MTB t-1 -0.0119 -0.0011 0.0016 -0.0146 0.0021* 0.0012* 
 (-1.36) (-1.61) (1.62) (-1.73) (1.99) (1.91) 
Capex t-1 1.4013*** 0.2019** 0.2101*** 0.2192*** 0.2173*** 0.1982*** 
 (4.23) (2.15) (3.16) (2.90) (3.12) (2.70) 
Lev t-1 -0.3201** -0.2606*** -0.2109*** -0.2328*** -0.2736*** -0.2192*** 
 (-2.11) (-3.12) (-2.80) (-4.00) (-6.02) (-3.99) 
Div t-1 -0.1115*** -0.0201 -0.0837*** -0.0133 -0.0672*** -0.0112 
 (-2.89) (-1.75) (-4.58) (-1.32) (-2.98) (-1.83) 
Size t-1 0.0125*** 0.1240*** -0.0190*** -0.0270*** -0.0201*** -0.0173*** 
 (2.82) (2.69) (-3.18) (-3.09) (-2.85) (-2.68) 
CF t-1 -1.1323** -0.0219 -0.1122*** -0.0431 -0.1302*** -1.0132 
 (-2.19) (-1.95) (-3.10) (-1.41) (-2.01) (-1.56) 
CEO tenure t-1 0.0019 -0.0181 -0.0011 -0.0140 0.0011 -0.0014 
 (1.61) (-1.13) (-1.03) (-1.19) (1.71) (-1.52) 
Rem com size t-1 -0.0015 -0.0112 -0.0019 -0.0141 -0.0023 -0.0043 
 (-1.13) (-1.09) (-1.80) (-1.42) (-1.19) (-1.61) 
Rem com ind t-1 0.0124 0.0141 -0.0110 -0.0018 0.0123 0.0043 
 (1.19) (1.45) (-1.09) (-1.15) (1.76) (1.25) 
Industry effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 2.5075*** 1.9906*** 0.5124*** 1.2012*** 1.4053*** 1.2637*** 
 (4.58) (3.07) (4.03) (3.66) (6.11) (3.65) 
N 1498 1498 1945 1945 2992 2992 
adjusted R2 0.318 0.213 0.289 0.199 0.279 0.211 
Table 7 shows the regression of CEO compensation incentives and the Act on cash holdings along with other control variables (year 
t-1). The dependent variable is cash holdings in a given year. Columns 1–6 show the impact of the interactions between Ln options × 
Act, Ln equity comp × Act, and Ln total comp × Act impact on cash holdings in year t. Industry effects are based on Global Industry 
Classification Standards (GICS) codes. The t–statistics are heteroskedastic consistent standard errors clustered at firm level and 
reported below the parameters in parentheses. Standardized beta coefficients are reported at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels with 
***, **, * respectively. 
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Table 8 The effect of the Act and CEO compensation incentives on the value of cash holdings 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Ln options × Act 0.0132***   
 (2.84)   
Ln options × Act ×Δcash 0.199**   
 (2.19)   
Ln equity comp × Act  0.0122***  
  (2.41)  
Ln equity comp × Act × Δcash  0.212***  
  (2.65)  
Ln total comp × Act   0.0012*** 
   (2.54) 
Ln total comp × Act × Δcash   0.114** 
   (2.21) 
Δcash 0.0141* 0.0113 0.0113** 
 (1.79) (1.64) (2.29) 
Cash 0.0112 0.0142 0.0126* 
 (1.01) (1.04) (1.99) 
MTB t-1 -0.0213 -0.0016 -0.0741* 
 (-1.10) (-1.23) (-1.89) 
Capex t-1 1.0204*** 0.1130*** 0.1212*** 
 (2.23) (3.16) (2.91) 
Lev t-1 -0.2021** -0.2150*** -0.2121*** 
 (-2.21) (-2.80) (-2.46) 
Div t-1 -0.1325** -0.0837*** -0.0210* 
 (-2.19) (-2.58) (-1.82) 
Size t-1 0.0121*** 0.0141*** 0.0190** 
 (2.69) (2.28) (2.19) 
CF t-1 -1.0019** -0.1051*** -0.0125 
 (-2.26) (-2.60) (-2.11) 
CEO tenure t-1 0.0142* 0.0314* 0.0121* 
 (1.96) (1.89) (1.79) 
Rem com size t-1 0.0125 0.0129* 0.0123 
 (1.74) (1.81) (1.59) 
Rem com ind t-1 0.0112 0.0312 0.0127 
 (1.20) (1.21) (1.13) 
Lev × Δcash t-1 -0.0231 -0.1313 0.0318 
 (01.43) (1.43) (1.48) 
Cash × Δcash t-1 -0.0421 0.0511 0.1107 
 (1.60) (1.71) (1.63) 
Constant 1.1035*** 0.1320*** 1.1932*** 
 (3.58) (4.25) (3.12) 
N 1498 1945 2992 
adjusted R2 0.291 0.201 0.255 
Table 8 shows the regression of CEO compensation incentives and the Act on the value of cash holdings along 
with other control variables (year t-1). The dependent variable is excess return in a given year. Δcash is the one 
year change in cash holdings. Columns 1–3 show the impact of the interactions between Ln options × Act × Δ 
cash, Ln equity comp × Act × Δ cash, and Ln total comp × Act× Δ cash impact on the value of cash holdings in 
year t. The t–statistics are heteroskedastic consistent standard errors clustered at firm level and reported below 
the parameters in parentheses. Standardized beta coefficients are reported at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
with ***, **, * respectively. 
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Online Appendix A 
Remuneration Amendment Act, CEO compensation and cash holdings 
We re-run equation (2) using a 3-year narrow sample to minimize the trending effect 
and influence of other confounding factors from a long sample period following Ferri and 
Maber (2013). The narrow sample enables us to examine the spill-over impact of the 
legislation on cash holdings. Thus, to capture the post regulation changes, we use three 
years pre- (2008–2010) and post-Act (2012–2014) to stack the necessary data for 
regressions. Table A2 reports the results that are the same as those reported in Table 5, 
lending support to H2.  
 [Insert Table A1 about here] 
We conclude that regulatory change reduces the agency problem between principals 
and agents. Our results are consistent with the recommendations of the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council (ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
2014), which encourage the equity incentives to align the interests of shareholders and 
managers.  
CEO Compensation and cash holdings analysis 
We model the relationship between CEO compensation incentives and corporate 
cash holdings to determine the prevailing management motive for holding cash. This 
model enables us to investigate the contemporaneous relationship between compensation 
incentives and cash holdings. The dependent variable is corporate cash holdings (Cash), 
measured in a cash-to-asset ratio, and the independent variables are stock options, equity 
and total compensation. We exclude cash bonus from the analysis as we find little 
theoretical significance in the relationship between cash bonus and cash holdings. The 
model is shown in the following equation: 
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ℎ =  + (	
 
	
) + (	) + ∑( !	" ##	) +
 $∑(% ##	) + &           (i) 
Table A2 presents the regression results that investigate the effect of CEO options, 
equity and total compensation on cash holdings using OLS and FE estimations. The 
regression models are well fitted, as depicted by R-squares ranging from 0.160 to 0.459 
and statistically significant. Columns 1–2 show the relationship between stock options 
(Ln options) and cash holdings using pooled OLS and FE. Both Columns show positive 
and significant (p < 1%) relationships between CEO options and cash holdings.  
[Insert Table A2 about here] 
Columns 3–4 show the relationship between equity compensation (Ln equity comp) 
and cash holdings. Columns 3 and 4, using pooled OLS and FE estimation, show positive 
and significant results (p < 1%, and p < 10%, respectively). Similarly, Columns 5–6 test 
the relationship between total compensation (Ln total comp) and cash holdings and show 
positive and significant results (all at p < 5%).  
The results, which show that CEO options, equity and total compensations are all 
significantly and positively related to corporate cash holdings19 indicate that equity-based 
(options and shares) compensation (and the related total compensation) increases cash 
levels of Australian firms. These findings suggest, over the entire sample period 2004–
2015, that the agency motive of management for holding excess cash prevails. 
The coefficients reported in Table A2 may be biased, as compensation incentives 
are not in fact exogenously structured. For instance, compensation incentives may depend 
on the size of firm, the cash flows available for distribution, and the form of the incentives. 
To address causality concerns, we include the one-year lagged variables following 
                                                          
19 We test the linearity of relationship between compensation incentives (Ln options, Ln equity comp, and Ln total comp) and find 
positive and significant results (p < 1%). 
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Harford et al. (2008). We replace the contemporaneous explanatory variables 
(compensation incentives) with their lagged values (i.e., year t-1) using the following 
equation:  
ℎ, =  + (1 	
 
	
), + (	), +
∑( !	" ##	) + $∑(% ##	) + &                (ii)           
Table A3 reports the results, which can be interpreted statistically to be the same as those 
reported in Table A2. 
    [Insert Table A3 about here] 
Alternate variables specification 
We employ alternate variables for compensation measures to test the sensitivity of 
results, as by Monem and Ng (2013). We replace the Ln options with an options award 
divided by total compensation (Options/total comp), and replace the Ln equity comp with 
equity incentives/total comp, consistent with previous studies (Mehran, 1995; Chen et al., 
2006; Li et al., 2011). 
    [Insert Table A4 about here] 
Table A4 shows the results of the alternate variable specifications using pooled OLS and 
panel fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 report the statistically significant and positive effect 
of Options/total comp on cash holdings. Equity incentives/total comp is also significantly 
positively related to cash holdings. Our results are consistent with the previous findings 
reported in Table A2. We also test (un-tabulated) the sensitivity of the analysis by splitting 
our sample into pre- and post-legislation and find statistically similar results. 
Value of cash holdings 
We use the Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) approach to examine the value of the 
cash holdings. This approach represents a long-run event study where the particular event 
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is the expected change in cash holdings. We measure the value of cash by examining how 
the unexpected change in the cash holdings affects excess stock return using the following 
model. 
2 − 24 =  + (ℎ) + (	) + (5ℎ)
+ $(5ℎ ∗ 	 ∗ 	
 
	
) + )(674) + 8(9)
+ :(1) + ;(<=) + >(?
@) + A(B) + (CD 	!)
+ (2  
@) + (2  
 ) + $(1 ∗ 5ℎ)
+ )(ℎ ∗ 5ℎ) + & 
where 5 represents change in X variables of i firm in year t-1 to t. 2 − 24 indicates excess 
stock return for firm i during fiscal year t from firm i’s benchmark return. The excess 
return is considered to be the cumulative abnormal return during a fiscal year as it includes 
the impact of the unexpected change in cash holdings on the change in shareholder value. 
We use the realized change in cash holdings as the unexpected change in cash. All the 
variables are scaled by a one-year lagged market value of equity (year t-1) to ensure that 
larger firms do not bias our results. We construct the interaction between CEO 
compensation incentives, the Act, and 5cash to examine the impact on the value of cash. 
We also include other control variables that may have an effect on cash holdings, 
following Faulkender and Wang (2006). All other variables are explained in Table 1. 
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Table A1 shows the regression of CEO compensation incentives and the Act on cash holdings 
along with other control variables in a narrow window of 6 years (3 years before and after the 
Act) using OLS. Columns 1–3 show the impact of the interactions between Ln options × Act, 
Ln equity comp × Act, and Ln total comp × Act impact on cash holdings in year t. Industry 
effects are based on Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS) codes. The t–statistics are 
heteroskedastic consistent standard errors clustered at firm level and reported below the 
parameters in parentheses. Standardized beta coefficients are reported at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels with ***, **, * respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A1 The effect of the Act and CEO compensation on cash holdings: a narrow sample 
  
Variables 
 (1) (2) (3)  
  Cash  
Ln options × Act  -0.0017**    
 (-2.00)    
Ln equity comp × Act   -0.0013**   
  (-2.03)   
Ln total comp  × Act   -0.0016***  
   (-2.78)  
MTB 0.0129*** 0.0125*** 0.0127***  
 (3.91) (4.75) (5.65)  
Capex 0.2460*** 0.2416*** 0.2884***  
 (3.30) (3.64) (4.67)  
Lev -0.3648*** -0.3418*** -0.3752***  
 (-9.59) (-10.50) (-11.49)  
Div -0.0913*** -0.0822*** -0.0671***  
 (-4.64) (-4.86) (-4.67)  
Size -0.0128*** -0.0081** -0.0142***  
 (-2.73) (-1.97) (-3.91)  
CF -0.0866 -0.1309** -0.1336**  
 (-1.47) (-2.18) (-2.52)  
CEO tenure -0.0003 -0.0007 0.0007  
 (-0.32) (-0.81) (0.78)  
Rem com size 0.0020 -0.0005 -0.0009  
 (0.40) (-0.13) (-0.27)  
Rem com ind -0.0152 -0.0123 -0.0056  
 (-0.77) (-0.71) (-0.41)  
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes  
Year effect Yes Yes Yes  
Constant 0.6148*** 0.5069*** 0.6283***  
 (6.37) (6.15) (8.51)  
N 825 1083 1559  
adjusted R2 0.347 0.325 0.338  
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Table A2. CEO compensation incentives and cash holdings    
  Cash 
Independent variables 
(1)  
OLS 
(2)  
FE 
(3)  
OLS 
(4)  
FE 
(5)  
OLS 
(6)  
FE 
Ln options 0.0107***      
 (3.16)      
Ln options  0.0087***     
  (3.31)     
Ln equity comp   0.0149***    
   (5.13)    
Ln equity comp    0.0045*   
    (1.78)   
Ln total comp     0.0099**  
     (2.14)  
Ln total comp      0.0077** 
      (2.55) 
MTB 0.0020 0.0005 0.0022 0.0005 0.0031*** -0.0001 
 (1.19) (1.53) (1.29) (1.37) (6.78) (-0.48) 
Capex 0.2275*** 0.2505*** 0.2095*** 0.2533*** 0.2149*** 0.3446*** 
 (3.82) (2.63) (3.96) (3.23) (5.71) (13.98) 
Lev -0.3924*** -0.3091*** -0.3300*** -0.2614*** -0.3693*** -0.1198*** 
 (-12.12) (-4.94) (-11.55) (-5.17) (-17.35) (-6.87) 
Div -0.1076*** -0.0133 -0.1026*** 0.0012 -0.0954*** 0.0157** 
 (-7.29) (-0.95) (-7.92) (0.10) (-10.22) (2.45) 
Size -0.0170*** -0.0372*** -0.0173*** -0.0396*** -0.0186*** -0.0087** 
 (-3.67) (-2.78) (-4.39) (-3.62) (-6.35) (-2.43) 
CF -0.1126*** -0.0472 -0.1260*** -0.0554 -0.1063*** -0.1980*** 
 (-2.81) (-1.01) (-3.36) (-1.27) (-5.34) (-15.38) 
CEO tenure -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0006 0.0005 -0.0001 
 (-0.13) (-0.62) (-1.31) (-0.64) (0.83) (-0.14) 
Rem com size 0.0028 -0.0021 0.0013 -0.0047 0.0019 -0.0018 
 (0.71) (-0.55) (0.42) (-1.30) (0.69) (-1.14) 
Rem com ind 0.0027 0.0030 -0.0009 -0.0026 0.0121 0.0020 
 (0.18) (0.25) (-0.07) (-0.24) (1.22) (0.36) 
Industry effect Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.5536*** 0.9085*** 0.5201*** 1.0075*** 0.5605*** 0.2084*** 
 (6.26) (3.43) (7.57) (4.50) (10.11) (2.75) 
N 1498 1498 1945 1945 2992 2992 
adjusted R2 0.360 0.160 0.338 0.127 0.324 0.459 
Table A2 shows the regression of CEO compensation incentives on cash holdings along with other control variables based on equation 
i. The dependent variable cash holdings is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets in a given year. Columns 1–6 show 
the impact of  Ln options, Ln equity comp and Ln total comp on cash holdings in year t, respectively. The t–statistics are heteroskedastic 
consistent standard errors clustered at firm level and reported below the parameters in parentheses. Standardized beta coefficients are 
reported at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels with ***, **, * respectively.  
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Table A3 Regression of cash holdings on lagged CEO compensation incentives 
  
Variables 
Cash 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln options,t-1 0.0003**   
 (1.99)   
Ln equity comp,t-1  0.0130***  
  (4.93)  
Ln total comp,t-1   0.0059** 
   (2.12) 
MTB 0.0021 0.0023 0.0031* 
 (1.28) (1.38) (1.91) 
Capex 0.2603*** 0.2184*** 0.2139*** 
 (4.52) (4.08) (4.59) 
Lev -0.4308*** -0.3630*** -0.3698*** 
 (-13.76) (-12.91) (-14.94) 
Div -0.1144*** -0.1061*** -0.0951*** 
 (-7.66) (-8.18) (-9.06) 
Size -0.0116*** -0.0150*** -0.0165*** 
 (-2.74) (-4.10) (-4.55) 
CF -0.1124*** -0.1268*** -0.1067*** 
 (-2.76) (-3.43) (-3.21) 
CEO tenure -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0005 
 (-0.29) (-0.56) (0.78) 
Rem com size 0.0050 0.0028 0.0021 
 (1.28) (0.86) (0.80) 
Rem con ind 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0125 
 (0.00) (-0.02) (1.24) 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.5978*** 0.5086*** 0.5847*** 
 (7.26) (7.21) (9.06) 
N 1512 1945 2991 
adjusted R2 0.363 0.349 0.323 
Table A3 shows the regression of cash holdings and one-year lagged CEO compensation 
incentives along with other control variables based on the following equation (ii) 
ℎ, =  + (1 	
 
	
), + (	), +
∑( !	" ##	) + $∑(% ##	) + &  
Columns 1–3 regress the cash holdings on Ln options, Ln equity comp, and Ln total comp at time 
t-1. The industry effects are based on Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS) codes. The 
t–statistics are heteroskedastic consistent standard errors cluster at firm level and reported below 
the parameters in parentheses. Standardized beta coefficients are reported at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels with ***, **, * respectively. 
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Table A4 Regression of alternate CEO compensation incentives 
Variables 
 Cash   
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
FE 
Options/total comp 0.0522* 0.0610***   
 (1.91) (2.59)   
Equity incentive/total comp   0.0789*** 0.0436** 
   (3.32) (2.25) 
MTB 0.0021 0.0005 0.0023 0.0005 
 (1.20) (1.19) (1.30) (1.27) 
Capex 0.2247*** 0.2514*** 0.2095*** 0.2572*** 
 (3.78) (5.06) (3.94) (5.93) 
Lev -0.3967*** -0.3120*** -0.3341*** -0.2624*** 
 (-12.20) (-8.35) (-11.61) (-8.48) 
Div -0.1071*** -0.0128 -0.1007*** 0.0015 
 (-7.26) (-0.88) (-7.73) (0.12) 
Size -0.0125*** -0.0343*** -0.0114*** -0.0383*** 
 (-2.98) (-4.50) (-3.22) (-5.88) 
CF -0.1133*** -0.0484* -0.1265*** -0.0564** 
 (-2.83) (-1.78) (-3.38) (-2.44) 
CEO tenure -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0006 
 (-0.13) (-0.49) (-1.22) (-0.62) 
Rem com size 0.0030 -0.0021 0.0016 -0.0048* 
 (0.76) (-0.61) (0.50) (-1.66) 
Rem com ind 0.0030 0.0035 -0.0006 -0.0025 
 (0.20) (0.29) (-0.05) (-0.24) 
Industry effect Yes  Yes  
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.5804*** 0.9463*** 0.5587*** 1.0266*** 
 (6.44) (6.08) (7.89) (7.63) 
N 1498 1498 1945 1945 
adjusted R2 0.358 0.140 0.333 0.126 
Table A4 shows the regression of cash holdings and alternate proxies of CEO compensation incentives along with other control 
variables. Columns 1–2 regress cash holdings in year t on the alternate proxy Options/total comp of (Ln options). Columns 3–
4 regress the dependent variable on the alternate proxy Equity incentive/total comp of (Ln equity comp), respectively. Industry 
effects are based on Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS) codes. The t–statistics are heteroskedastic consistent 
standard errors cluster at firm level and reported below the parameters in parentheses. Standardized beta coefficients are 
reported at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels with ***, **, * respectively.  
 
 
